The Court of Appeal held that the term “violence” referred to in section 177(1) of the Housing Act 1996 required some form of physical contact, and that the term should be given its ordinary natural meaning. Matthew Feldman appeared for the Respondent.
Reference: t.b.c.
Date: 15th December 2009
Court: Court of Appeal
Judges: Waller, Laws and Etherton LJJ
Counsel: Matthew Feldman, Martin Hodgson
Summary
By section 175(3) of the Housing Act 1996 (‘the Act’), a person is homeless, even if he has accommodation available, if it would not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy it. Further specific provision is made to deem accommodation to be unreasonable if it is probable that doing so would lead to domestic violence or other violence against him (s177(1) of the Act). In Danesh v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2007] 1 WLR 69, the Court of Appeal held that “violence” meant physical violence involving some sort of physical contact.
The Appellant was a married woman with two children, who had been living with her husband in their matrimonial home. She applied to the Respondent for housing assistance claiming that she had been forced to leave the matrimonial home because her husband had subjected her to emotional, psychological and financial abuse. She accepted that she had never been physically assaulted. The Respondent concluded that it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy the matrimonial home as it was improbable that this would lead to domestic violence or threats of violence which were likely to be carried out. Her appeal to the county court was dismissed, and she appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government made written submissions in support of the Appellant.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Danesh was correctly decided and was binding on the Court. The Homelessness Code of Guidance published in July 2006 widened the scope of “violence” to include other non-physical forms of abuse, but the Court held that where there was any inconsistency between the Code of Guidance and the statute as interpreted by the Court, the statute should prevail, applying Griffin v Westminster CC [2004] HLR 32. In any event, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the meaning of “violence” had changed since Danesh was decided.
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