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Re G (Designation of Local Authority) [2024] EWCA Civ 1565

Re G (Designation of Local Authority) [2024] EWCA Civ 1565

The Court of Appeal upholds Calderdale as the designated authority following a dispute with Cheshire Council over the designation of the local authority responsible for a baby boy, G, in care proceedings. ​ 

Background: 
G was born prematurely on 12 July 2024 and Cheshire Council issued care proceedings on the same day. ​​​ The parents had a lengthy history with Cheshire’s children’s services, including issues of domestic abuse, substance and alcohol misuse, and mental health problems. ​​​ The parents expressed an intention to relocate from Cheshire to Calderdale to escape traumatic associations, and consequently moved to a caravan in Calderdale in mid-May 2024. ​​ The mother registered with a GP in Calderdale and had an antenatal appointment there. G’s parents maintained loose ties with their previous accommodation in Cheshire where they had been facing eviction proceedings.

Relevant Circumstances and Accommodation relating to G:

  • G spent the first five days of his life in a hospital in Manchester (12 – 16th July 2024).
  • 22 days in a hospital in Calderdale, with daily substantial care from his mother.
  • On 8 August, G moved to a residential unit located between Cheshire and Calderdale for assessment with his mother under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989. ​​​

Legal Framework:

  • Section 31(8) CA 1989: The local authority designated in a care order must be the authority within whose area the child is ordinarily resident (a). ​​​​ If the child does not reside in the area of any local authority, the designated authority must be the one within whose area any circumstances arose in consequence of which the order is being made (b). ​​​​
  • Section 105(6) CA 1989: “Ordinary residence” of a child excludes periods when the child lives in a school or other institution, under supervision orders, youth rehabilitation orders, or accommodation provided by the local authority. ​​​​
  • The court also considered the main authorities and very helpfully distilled the points of general application from those authorities (which the writer thinks should feature in any skeleton argument) [not included here for brevity; but please refer to [§ 44-46].

Court’s Determination:

  1. Ordinary Residence: The court did not resolve whether hospitals are ‘institutions’ under section 105(6) but concurred with the Recorder that G’s 22-day hospital stay should be disregarded.​​​ Even if Cheshire’s argument were correct, a 22-day stay in a hospital would not be sufficient for G to acquire ordinary residence in Calderdale independently of his mother [§48-49 & 64-66]. ​​​
  2. Ordinary Residence of Dependency: The court upheld that a newborn’s ordinary residence generally follows that of the mother, but acknowledged that this is not an absolute rule, C (A Child) v Plymouth; A v A  [SC] 2014. ​​​When considering the disregard provisions in section 105(6), the court clarified that those apply to the child, not the mother, recognising G’s presence in Calderdale since the mother moved there to provide care [§50-60 & 67-73]. ​​​
  3. Mother’s Ordinary Residence: The court found sufficient evidence that the mother had integrated into Calderdale, her intentions having ‘translated’ into her move there in mid-May, as evidenced by her GP registration, antenatal care, and time caring for G in the Calderdale hospital. The judge ruled she became ordinarily resident there by 23 August 2024, making G ordinarily resident by dependency. [§24, 74-76].
  4. Circumstances Leading to the Order: The court found G’s residence in Calderdale under section 31(8)(a), making section 31(8)(b) unnecessary, but noted section 31(8)(b) is intentionally broad and not limited to a single issue. [§61, 77-78]. ​​​

Conclusion

Calderdale’s appeal was dismissed. ​​​In upholding the Recorder’s decision, the Court of Appeal noted that the Recorder had been “faithful to the oft-repeated guidance offered by Thorpe LJ in Northamptonshire to undertake a rapid and not over-sophisticated review of the history….in order to make a purely factual (not discretionary) determination of the child’s place of ordinary residence”. The court emphasised the need to avoid designation disputes unless exceptionally warranted. While this case was not exceptional, some new points were acknowledged specifically those at §48-49, and §64-73. Ultimately, the court highlighted the importance of ensuring that the local authority most closely connected to the child’s current living situation is responsible for providing necessary services, thus focusing on the bigger picture [§62, 79, 81] (but not on the often complicated, intricate and at times unedifying arguments made by local authorities vying against each other to avoid responsibility).

Case Summary by Hazel Samuriwo, with permission from The Family Law Week.

Re G (Designation of Local Authority) [2024] EWCA Civ 1565 Judgment.

For a more detailed analysis of this case and key takeaways for practitioners, please see an article by the author here.


10th Jan 2025

Hazel Samuriwo

Call 2021| Admitted as a Solicitor: 2016

Hazel Samuriwo

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