Sam Healy acts in Ridley v. Brown [2025] UKSC 7

Introduction

On 26 February 2025, the Supreme Court handed down its unanimous Judgment in Ridley v. Brown [2025] UKSC 7.  It is an important decision about the way in which owners of registered land can claim adverse possession of land on the boundary with neighbours and, most importantly, how the test set out in paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 should be applied in such cases.  The Judgment contains a helpful analysis of the de minimis principle (and its application when construing legislation) and puts to bed an argument about the status (and correctness) of the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the same legislation in Zarb v. Parry. Finally, in delivering the lead judgment, Lord Briggs also re-emphasises the importance of neighbours involved in such disputes engaging in all forms of ADR before stepping on the escalator of litigation.

The Facts

The Ridleys had lived at their home in Consett, Co. Durham, known as ‘Valley View’, for a number of years before they decided to build a new house within what they thought were the boundaries of the property.  Their neighbour, Mr Brown, owed a large area of open scrubland bordering Valley View.  The dispute between the parties arose because the plot of the new house (which was to be known as ‘Moonrakers’), once built, appeared to encroach into a strip of land that, according to HM Land Registry records, was part of Mr Brown’s registered title

This strip of land was, until construction work started on Moonrakers, on the Ridleys’ side of the boundary feature, a picket fence and hedge, separating their property from Mr Brown’s land. It had been part of the garden of Valley View for many years, since 2004 at least, and the Ridleys were still in possession of it at the time of their application for registration of it on the grounds of adverse possession in December 2019.

A key factual issue in the case was when it was that the Ridleys’ reasonable belief that the strip of land belonged to them came to an end.  Judge Bastin at the First Tier Tribunal [‘FTT’] found that this happened in February 2018, when they learnt about the line of the registered boundary as part of the process of obtaining planning permission for Moonrakers.  

This meant that, as of the date of their application for registration of the of the strip of land in their own names, the Ridleys had not held their reasonable belief in ownership of the land for something like 21 months.  However, the FTT found that this was not fatal to the Ridleys’ application for registration of the strip of land, for reasons that the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with, and the conclusion was reached that the Register should be altered to reflect the strip of land falling within the title of Moonrakers.

The Decision

The factual finding about the period during which the reasonable belief was held was an important one in the context of the legal test for adversely possessing registered land on a boundary (i.e. Schedule 6, paragraph 5(4) of the Land Registration Act 2002).

That subparagraph sets out what is commonly referred to as “the boundary condition”, one of the three conditions on which a party can rely when their claim to adverse possession of registered land is opposed by the party within whose title the land presently falls.

There was no dispute between the parties that three of the four requirements of the boundary condition were met, including that the Court was dealing with land (as is usually the case) where the exact  line of the boundary had not been determined by HM Land Registry and the “general boundaries” principle applied.

The requirement on which the parties could not agree was that in paragraph 5(4)(c), which provides (emphasis added):

“for at least 10 years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him,”

The Ridleys argued that, on a correct interpretation of the subparagraph, this meant that they as applicants could rely on any period of 10 years within the more general period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application to HM Land Registry.  It need not be the 10 years ending on the date of the application, as Mr Brown, the respondent to the appeal, had argued.

The principal difficulty with the respondent’s interpretation was that it required the party claiming adverse possession of land on the boundary between the two properties to make their application for registration on the same day that their reasonable belief that the land was theirs came to an end.  In argument before the Supreme Court, the respondent acknowledged that this may cause practical problems (Who can after all get an application for adverse possession of registered land made, with all the thought that goes with that and collation of evidence, on the very same day that they are disabused of their erstwhile belief that the land was theirs?) but nonetheless argued these could be avoided by recourse to the de minimis principle, it effectively allowing something akin to a period of grace of two months or so during which an application could be made after the ending of the squatter’s reasonable belief.  

It was also part of the respondent’s case that the overall scheme of the 2002 Act was to ensure that the Register was more up to date than it had been previously, under the Land Registration Act 1925, which in turn meant applicants for adverse possession applying as soon as they can rather than allowing disputes to fester, the quality of the evidence needed in support of paragraph 5(4), including fulfilment of the reasonable belief condition, diminishing with the passage of time.

The respondent’s arguments were rejected by Lord Briggs, who gave the only Judgment.  He began (see paragraph 24) by noting that boundaries were still, in the vast majority of cases, not defined on the Register.  This was because of the “general boundaries” principle preserved by the 2002 Act.  In light of this, the more general objectives of the 2003 reforms (i.e. getting a more up to date Register) were not especially significant when considering how the boundary condition should be interpreted.

However, the main reason for rejecting the respondent’s argument was its inevitable consequence, if accepted, of requiring applicants to make applications to HM Land Registry on the day they lost their reasonable belief.  This was impractical and ignored the realities of neighbours considering such an application first requiring time to take legal advice, gather evidence, weigh up the proportionality of pursuing the proposed action given the costs involved and, perhaps most importantly, consider ADR.

Furthermore, the de minimis principle (meaning that the law is not concerned with trifles) could not be used to save the respondent’s proposed interpretation of paragraph 5(4).  At the very least, the applicant considering an application would need the one or two months suggested by the respondent to gather evidence, weigh up matters etc., and that simply could not properly be described as a trivial, inconsequential or irrelevant period of time (i.e. de minimis).  It was also noteworthy that where Parliament had wanted a period of grace to apply to steps required to be taken under the Act, it had expressly provided for such (see paragraph 35 of the Judgment).  So, if Parliament had wanted to allow a month or two to bring an application following the ending of the reasonable belief, then it could be expected to have said so.

As such, the Ridleys’ appeal against the Judgment of the Upper Tribunal (which had itself reversed the FTT’s decision, on the basis of what it considered to be a binding Court of Appeal authority on the point, Zarb v. Parry, Edwin Johnson J making it clear that he did not agree with the decision), was allowed.  This will have the practical effect of the Ridleys being registered as the owners of the disputed land, including that part on which Moonrakers is now built.

Comment

Most (but not all) boundary disputes will now involve registered, as opposed to unregistered, land, meaning the LRA 2002 and specifically Schedule 6 will apply.  For those involved in such disputes, as litigants or advisors, the starting point for the claimant will still be proving that they have been in adverse possession of the disputed property (e.g. the strip of land that might appear, according to Land Registry records, to fall within your neighbour’s title, but which you have been in factual possession of, treating it as your own) and that this continues up to the date of the application to the Land Registry for adverse possession.

The claimant will also need to prove that, for at least ten years of that overarching period of adverse possession, they had objectively reasonable grounds for believing it was their land (i.e. belonged to them).  This might be the fact that the land was enclosed by their hedge or fence, had their belongings stored on it, they controlled access to it or that they cultivated the land.  The range of potential circumstances are wide and it will always be a fact sensitive question.

However, the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Ridley takes away the urgency to rush off to court as soon as the claimant loses that reasonable belief in ownership (e.g. when their neighbour points out that the land is in fact within their registered title).  Instead, the claimant will want to consider their position, possibly gather evidence (including surveying evidence), perhaps negotiate with their neighbour and then, and only if they decide that the matter is sufficiently strong on its merits and also that it is proportionate to litigate, issue an application for adverse possession before HM Land Registry.  

Although the need for urgency has gone, the claimant will not want to wait too long to issue their application, as the longer they delay from the 10 years’ reasonable belief coming to an end, the harder they may find it to make out their case under paragraph 5(4).

In applying the analysis it did of Schedule 6 paragraph 5(4), it won’t escape any land lawyer the importance the Supreme Court placed on, in so far as possible, keeping boundary disputes out of court (and the FTT).  That is not a new sentiment but a reaffirmation of the importance of ADR in this particular type of litigation, whether it be a chat over the garden fence or something more formal, is always welcome.

Ridley v.Brown [2025] UKSC 7 Judgment of the Supreme Court

Sam Healy of 42BR appeared at first instance, before Judge Bastin in the First Tier Tribunal Property Chamber (Land Registration) and again in the Supreme Court, where he was led by Simon Goldberg KC of Trinity Chambers.  

Sam and Simon were instructed by Matthew Sigsworth of Ward Hadaway LLP, Newcastle.

3rd Mar 2025

Sam Healy

Call 1999